Changing Economic Openness for Environmental Policy Convergence: When Can Trade Agreements Induce Convergence of Environmental Regulation?
Michael M. Bechtel, Jale Tosun
International Studies Quarterly, 2009
Abstract
Citizens' concerns about (international) environmental protection standards are of increasing importance to governments in industrially advanced, high-regulating countries. In almost any proposal for a trade agreement, countries with low environmental regulation standards are required to introduce higher policy standards in exchange for high-regulating countries dismantling their trade barriers and granting access to their domestic markets. Low-regulating countries often act as required and introduce legislation aimed at reducing pollution. This leads to declaratory or de jure policy convergence. But such legislative action is not always associated with de facto or actual policy convergence, since policies are not always enforced. To analyze the strategic aspect of this potential "slippage," we set up a game-theoretic model with imperfect information.
Key Finding
Trade gains, policy enforcement, reputation costs, and domestic environmental demands affect whether trade agreements lead to actual vs. merely declaratory policy convergence.
Cite
Michael M. Bechtel, Jale Tosun (2009). Changing Economic Openness for Environmental Policy Convergence: When Can Trade Agreements Induce Convergence of Environmental Regulation?. International Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00565.x